Vind: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Provenance Framework for Energy Delivery Systems by Bandara, Eranga et al.
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
VMASC Publications Virginia Modeling, Analysis & Simulation Center 
2021 
Vind: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Provenance Framework 
for Energy Delivery Systems 
Eranga Bandara 
Old Dominion University 
Sachin Shetty 
Old Dominion University, sshetty@odu.edu 
Deepak Tosh 
Xueping Liang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/vmasc_pubs 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Operations and Supply Chain Management 
Commons 
Original Publication Citation 
Bandara, E., Shetty, S., Tosh, D., & Liang, X. (2021). Vind: A blockchain-enabled supply chain provenance 
framework for energy delivery systems. Frontiers in Blockchain, 4, 1-13, Article 607320. https://doi.org/
10.3389/fbloc.2021.607320 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Virginia Modeling, Analysis & Simulation Center at 
ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in VMASC Publications by an authorized administrator of 
ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
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1VMASC, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, United States, 2Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at El Paso,
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Enterprise-level energy delivery systems (EDSs) depend on different software or hardware
vendors to achieve operational efficiency. Critical components of these systems are
typically manufactured and integrated by overseas suppliers, which expands the attack
surface to adversaries with additional opportunities to infiltrate into EDSs. Due to this
reason, the risk management of the EDS supply chain is crucial to ensure that we are
knowledgeable about the vulnerabilities in software and hardware components that
comprise any critical part, quantifiable risk metrics to assess the severity and
exploitability of the attack, and provide remediation solutions that can influence a
prioritized mitigation plan. There is a need to realize cyber supply chain risk
management for industrial control systems’ hardware, software, and computing and
networking services associated with bulk electric system (BES) operations. This article
proposes a blockchain-based cyber supply chain provenance platform (“Vind”) for EDSs to
realize data provenance in a cyber supply chain ecosystem.
Keywords: blockchain, smart contract, big data, energy delivery systems, microservice architecture, supply chain,
supply chain and risk
1 INTRODUCTION
To achieve reliable and efficient energy delivery system (EDS) operations, utility companies typically
adopt various software/hardware products and solutions developed by third-party vendors. The
enterprises have realized significant advantages due to such outsourcing activities in terms of
continuous support services, just-in-time deliveries, elimination of inventories, globalization, and
reduced operational cost. Although these proprietary commercial-off-the-shelf solutions offer high
interoperability characteristics with a large variety of product features which the consumer enterprise
may not need, integration of such products and services in the critical EDS infrastructures
significantly increases the risk of supply chain–related threats, which could adversely impact the
reliability of bulk electric systems (BESs). In the past, several attempts (Ellison andWoody, 2010; Du
et al., 2013; CSRC, 2018) have shown how adversaries use strategic attack campaigns for extortion,
malicious data alterations, and exfiltrations. Attack via a manufacturer source code or product and
attack via vendor remote access are two such attack scenarios (Liang et al., 2018). The software
supply chain attacks are becoming prevalent and disrupting the inherent trust between the software
provider and the consumer. Thus, the involvement of multitude vendors, suppliers, distributors, and
integrators in EDSs must be well handled, and the supply chain risks introduced in the BES should be
mitigated through cyber-secure approaches.
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There is a need to manage the third-party and supply chain risks
for BESs. The plan will involve processes and actions for the utility
companies, vendors, and suppliers to strengthen the supply chain
risk management. However, the successful realization of this
standard hinges on the users, owners, and operators of BESs and
the third-party software/hardware vendors as well as suppliers who
are engaged in implementing various processes related to BESs. Since
these responsible entities must develop one or more documented
risk management plan by identifying and assessing the cyber risks
involved in BESs, it is important to build a collaborative security
ecosystem where multiple stakeholders can seamlessly handle the
vendor-identified incidents through effective notification,
coordination, disclosure, and validation mechanisms. In this way,
the enterprises will have increased visibility into the methods,
applications, and services to ensure integrity and authenticity of
all software provided by the vendors, thus providing a viable way to
manage the evolving cyber risks on the BES.
Typically, current state-of-the-art provenance systems can be
deployed through logging and auditing technologies to manage
the cyber supply chain risk (Ivanov, 2018). However, these
technologies are not effective in the cyber supply chain
infrastructure, which are complex in nature, due to several
layers of interoperating suppliers and vendors across
geographical and organizational boundaries. To identify the
origin, cause, and impact of violations in the cyber supply
chain infrastructures, the collection of forensics and logs from
diverse and disparate sources is required, which is an
insurmountable task. At the same time, logs only provide a
sequential history of actions related to every application.
We address the challenge of providing a resilient mechanism to
monitor and audit the processes involved in the vendor’s software
and hardware components of BESs. There is an increased
responsibility on the vendors to adopt software integrity criteria
and controls. The challenges for meeting supply chain risk
management requirements (Goff et al., 2014) (Contract, 2020)
involve a) timely notification, coordination, and disclosure of
vendor-identified incidents; b) software integrity and
authenticity; c) vendor remote access; and d) information system
planning. Realizing these functionalities is critical for BESs, which
would allow devising quantifiable risk metrics to assess the severity
and exploitability of BESs and develop prioritized risk remediation
solutions. While it is of utmost importance to develop a framework
of cyber-secure supply chain management, the multi-ownership
environment introduces additional challenges to establish inherent
trust among the involved entities. Provisioning transparency and
provenance-tracking services are therefore critical in order to build
trust and automate the supply chain risk management process. The
recent emergence of Blockchain technology has shown its true
potential in offering a tamper-resistant distributed ledger platform
that can be used to maintain data provenance in an effective and
secure manner. However, the practical deployment of Blockchain
for better management of the supply chain risks in BESs has not
been well studied. Further, the common issues existing in the cloud-
based data storage, such as the lack of data privacy, lack of data
immutability, lack of traceability, and lack of data provenance, are
still hindering around in the integration process of Blockchain
technology.
Therefore, in this article, we propose a Blockchain-based cyber
supply chain provenance system (“Vind”) for EDSs. At a macro
level, the approach followed to build Vind involves 1) the customer
outlining the performance and security requirements, 2) the
vendor identifying the appropriate hardware and software
suppliers that will meet the supply chain provenance
requirements, and 3) the suppliers ensuring that they report the
desired information that allows the customers to improve
auditability, attribution, and provenance of their critical assets.
The system also involves the integration of vulnerability databases
that would allow reporting to the stakeholders about potential
vulnerability risks associated with any component, and the supplier
will be notified to provide remediation plans.
The Vind platform is built on top of Rahasak blockchain,
which is highly scalable in terms of storage capability (Bandara
et al., 2018; 2021). This blockchain can be used to share the asset
supply chain information between multiple parties in EDSs. All
the physical/software asset information in EDSs and their supply
chain management information are stored in the blockchain. The
supply chain management functions are implemented as
blockchain smart contracts in the Vind platform (Bandara
et al., 2019; 2020). In this article, a performance evaluation of
the underlying blockchain storage in the Vind platform is
presented. The evaluation shows the scalability and transaction
throughput features in the Vind blockchain system. Following are
the main contributions from Vind.
1. A blockchain-based cyber supply chain provenance platform is
proposed to address the requirements of the supply chain risk
management.
2. Permissioned blockchain has been used to store all the
physical/software asset information in EDSs and their
supply chain provenance information.
3. Blockchain-based audit storage has been introduced to store
the audit logs of software/hardware assets and entities in the
Vind platform.
4. To address the privacy concerns in the blockchain, off-chain
storage has been integrated into the blockchain.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3
discuss the architecture and implementation details of the Vind
platform. Section 4 presents the performance evaluation of Vind.




Figure 1 depicts the architecture of the Vind platform. Vendors,
companies, and service providers and administrators are the
main stakeholders in the Vind platform. The service provider
is the host of the Vind platform. The service provider’s main
function is to on-board vendors and companies into the platform
without the central authority. Besides, the service providers will
offer services to various system entities but are not trusted from
the architecture perspective. All the registration information will
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be verified by the blockchain node for authenticity and future
validation. The service provider cannot modify the registration
information on the blockchain ledger, which is immutable and
tamper-resistant. Vendors produce hardware/software products,
and companies purchase these software/hardware products from
the vendors, which can be identified as assets. Each asset in the
Vind platform is represented with a unique digital identity (e.g.,
UUID). Blockchain provides a tamper-evident, shared digital
ledger that records data in a public or private peer-to-peer
network. Blockchain can be used to share the asset supply
chain information between multiple parties in EDSs. All the
physical/software asset information in EDSs and their supply
chain provenance information are stored in the blockchain. All
the blockchain functions of the Vind platform are implemented
with smart contracts. More information about these smart
contracts is discussed in Section 2.3. Companies, vendors, and
service providers are the blockchain clients of the application.
They will provide web/mobile applications to interact with
blockchain functions. Each blockchain client has its own off-
chain storage. Off-chain storage can store confidential data in
blockchain peers. The hash of the data stored in off-chain storage
can be published in the blockchain. In this way, Vind has
addressed the common issues in cloud-based data storage, lack
of data privacy, lack of data immutability, lack of traceability, and
lack of data provenance.
2.2 Functionality
Vind platform facilitates the following features related to vendor/
company/asset life cycle management and supply chain
management. There are separate smart contracts to handle
each of these functions in the Vind blockchain, as shown in
Figure 1. There are three main stakeholders in the Vind platform:
vendors, companies, and service provider/administrator. An
identity contract handles the identity registrations of each of
these entities. We have used a self-sovereign–based approach
when registering the identities in the Vind platform (Mühle et al.,
2018; Baars, 2016). Once identity is registered, the entity will be
onboard into the Vind platform. Basically, stakeholder’s life cycle
management of the Vind platform will be handled by the Identity
contract. Service providers who are the maintainer of the Vind
platform have the privilege to manage the life cycle of the vendors
and companies (basically edit, delete vendor/company profiles).
The software/hardware products in the EDS will be supplied by
the vendors. Companies (e.g., energy company/power plant)
purchase the products from vendors (purchased software/
hardware products identified as assets in the energy company).
When new assets are purchased in an energy company, their
information needs to be saved in the blockchain. This asset life
cycle management is handled by Asset contract 13. Theasset
contract supports functionality to create and search assets in the
blockchain. Once an asset is onboarded into the energy company,
there is an agreement formed between the vendor and the
company. This agreement defines the supply chain risk
management agreement terms (Goff et al., 2014; Contract,
2020). This agreement negotiation and the establishment is
handled by the Agreement contract 14.
Various notifications (which relate to assets in the energy
companies) will be generated and sent to a responsible person in
the energy company and other organizations. All these notification
generation and sending functionalities will be handled by the
Notification contract 15. There are four main notification
scenarios in the Vind platform: a) notification about vendor-
identified attack incidents related to the products or services
(coordination of responses to vendor-identified incidents related
to the products or services), b) notification about vendor-identified
issues related to the products or services, c) notification by vendors
when remote or onsite access should no longer be granted to vendor
representatives, and d) disclosure by vendors of known
FIGURE 1 | Overview of the Vind architecture. Smart contract defines the application functions in the Vind platform. Blockchain clients (stakeholders) interact with
smart contract functions.
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vulnerabilities related to the products or services. We have
integrated the automatic attack discovery and notification
function of assets in the Vind platform by using the common
vulnerability exposure search API (CVE search API) (Pham and
Dang, 2018). CVE search API is a service that contains a list of CVE
security vulnerabilities of common software products. There is a
public CVE database available with all known vulnerabilities of
software products. We have incorporated a CVE search API to find
known vulnerabilities of software products/assets in the Vind
platform and notify them to the corresponding vendors and
companies. In the Vind platform, we have run our own CVE
search API service. It periodically fetches the vulnerabilities
published in the public CVE search API and generates
notifications based on the vulnerability.
There are various patches that can be sent for the software
products which are used by the energy companies. The integrity of
these patches needs to be verified by using a cryptographic method
[e.g., SHA256 hashing (Gueron et al., 2011)]. This integrity
checking and verification functionality are implemented with
the Verification contract. There should be coordination of
controls for vendor-initiated interactive remote access and
system-to-system remote access with a Vendor. For example,
when a third-party support person gets access (login) to
troubleshoot a software product at the energy company, their
access information should be traced. These access information
tracing will be implemented with the Trace contract. The audit log
of the assets, notifications, and identities is maintained in the Vind
platform’s blockchain ledger. This audit log contains all the events
that happened (e.g., create, edit, and delete) to the assets, identities,
and notifications in the Vind platform. It provides the data
provenance of the Vind platform on top of the blockchain ledger.
2.3 Vind Use Case
Consider a scenario where Vendor A, Company B, and the Vind
service provider (Vind administrator) want to procure products
and services in the Vind platform. The necessary interactions
occurring among these entities can be depicted as presented in
Figure 2. The administrator can log in to the system and manage
FIGURE 2 | Interaction diagram of a use case in Vind. Vind admin onboard vendors and companies into the platform. When a company purchases a product from
the vendor, agreement will be formed. The notifications regarding the products will be generated by vendors.
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the entities in the platform, Supplementary Appendix Figures
16, 17. In this scenario, first, the administrator will onboard
Company A and Vendor A into the Vind platform. When
onboarding, it registers basic information of the entities such
as email, name, and other information in the blockchain,
Supplementary Appendix Figures 18, 19. These onboarding
functions of the blockchain are implemented in the Identity smart
contract. Once onboarded, vendors and companies can register
into the platform by using the Vind mobile app/Web application
with the given e-mail address as the user identifier (e.g.,
username). Once logged-in, vendors can view the products
they have and the companies using those products from the
portal, Supplementary Appendix Figures 20–22. Vendors need
to onboard their products into the platform via the Web
application, Supplementary Appendix Figure 23. Companies
can view the purchased products (e.g., assets) and their
information from the company portal, Supplementary
Appendix Figures 24, 25. These product and asset life cycle
management functions are implemented with Asset contracts in
the blockchain.
When a company is purchasing a product from a vendor, that
product can be onboarded to the company through the company
web portal, Supplementary Appendix Figure 26. Assume
Company A is going to buy the product of Vendor A. When
buying a product (asset), the company needs to specify the asset
information and cyber supply chain agreement terms,
Supplementary Appendix Figure 27. At this time, the vendor
and company execute a supply chain agreement contract. The
agreement contract in Vind will implement the functionalities
needed to automate the supply chain risk management
requirements and notify Vendor A. Then, Vendor A fetches
the agreement terms from the blockchain and decides whether
to accept or reject these terms, Supplementary Appendix
Figure 28. If vendors accept the terms, Product A will be
linked to Company A in the Vind platform as an asset.
If, for instance, the vendor identifies an issue in Product A, it
must follow the agreement terms and is required to notify the
issue to Company A. This functionality is integrated with Vind to
enable the seamless release of software patches, notification of
vulnerabilities, and software updates for the products to the
companies. In order to ensure the integrity of the patches and
updates, they will be signed by the PGP key of the vendors.
Company users can enter the serial # of the patch and check the
integrity. Vind will allow the release of patches and updates to the
companies only when the integrity is verified. In each of the above
steps, audit logs will be created and stored in the blockchain,
Supplementary Appendix Figures 29, 30.
3 VIND IMPLEMENTATION
We have built the production version of the Vind platform to
support high scalability and high transaction load. To cope with
the high transaction load and back pressure (Destounis et al.,
2016) operations, we have adopted a reactive stream-based
approach using Akka streams (Davis, 2019). All the services in
the Vind platform are implemented as small services
(micro-services) with the single responsibility principle. These
services are dockerized (Merkel, 2014) and deployed using the
Kubernetes (Burns et al., 2016) container orchestration system.
All the microservice communications are handled via the Apache
Kafka (Kreps et al., 2011) message broker. We run 3 Kafka broker
nodes with 3 Zookeeper nodes in Vind. The platform is running
as a permissioned blockchain system in a private cloud. Figure 3
shows the architecture of the Vind platform.
Rahasak blockchain (Bandara et al., 2018; 2021) has been used
to implement the functionalities of the Vind platform. Rahasak is a
big data-friendly enterprise-level, a scalable blockchain platform.
The back-pressure operation of the scalable application is handled
with the reactive streaming-based approach in the Rahasak
blockchain. It comes with concurrency-enabled Aplos smart
contracts (Bandara et al., 2019; 2020) which are written with
the Scala functional programming language (Odersky et al.,
2004) and Akka actors (Hewitt, 2010; Gupta, 2012). This smart
contract platform supports high transaction throughput with
supporting concurrent transaction execution on the blockchain.
Rahasak blockchain facilitates full-text with the blockchain asset
using Elasticsearch-based search API. We have selected the
Rahasak blockchain to implement the Vind platform due to
these enterprise-level features on it. We were able to support
high transaction load, handle large volumes of back-pressure
operations, and support full-text search on Vind using the
Rahasak blockchain.
All the functionalities of the Vind platform are implemented
with Aplos smart contracts in the Rahasak blockchain. There are
four main smart contracts: a) identity contract, b) asset contract,
c) notification contract, and d) verification contract. Web/mobile
apps are the client applications on the Vind platform, invoking
various functions implemented in smart contracts on the
blockchain. The main functionalities include onboarding
vendors, asset management in blockchain, report incidents,
patch management, and view audit log. The requests generated
from Web/mobile apps will be directed to blockchain smart
contracts via the Vind gateway service which is HTTP REST
API built with Golang (Schmager et al., 2010). Mobile/web client
authentication/authorization will be handled by JWT-based
(Jones, 2011) auth service in the Vind platform. Web/mobile
client credential information will be stored in auth-storage
(database) in the auth service. The asset in the Vind platform
has assigned a unique digital identity. This identity is embedded
in the QR code. The Vind mobile application comes with a QR
code scanner. It can scan the QR code and fetch all the audit log
information and attack information which are related to the
software/hardware asset from the blockchain and visualize it.
The off-chain storage can store confidential data in the Vind
platform. Each peer in the network has its own off-chain storage.
They store confidential data on it and publish the hash of those
data into the blockchain ledger. We have used Apache Cassandra
(Lakshman and Malik, 2010) distributed storage to build the off-
chain storage in the Vind platform. The off-chain storage is
connected with Kibana and Grafana (Reelsen, 2014) analytics’
dashboard to do the data visualizations. The CVE search API is a
service that contains a list of all related CVE security
vulnerabilities of common software products. There is a public
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CVE database available with the known vulnerability of software
products. In the Vind platform, we have run our own CVE search
API service. It periodically fetches the vulnerabilities published in
the public CVE search API and generates notifications based on
the vulnerability. By using CVE search API, we have integrated
automatic attack discovery and notification functions of assets in
the Vind platform.
4 VIND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance evaluation of Vind was completed and is
discussed. To evaluate the performance of the underlying
blockchain ledger of the Vind platform, we have developed the
Vind ledger service with three different blockchain systems
[Rahasak Bandara et al. (2021), BigchaindDB McConaghy
et al. (2016), Hyperledger Fabric Androulaki et al. (2018)] and
compared the results. To obtain the results, we deployed the Vind
platform with a multi-peer blockchain cluster in AWS 2xlarge
instances (16 GB RAM and 8 CPUs). Rahasak blockchain runs
with 4 Kafka nodes, 3 Zookeeper nodes, and Apache Cassandra
(Lakshman and Malik, 2010) as the state database. The smart
contracts on the Rahasak blockchain implemented with the Scala
functional programming and an Akka actor-based Aplos
(Bandara et al., 2019, 2020) smart contract platform.
Hyperledger Fabric is set up to run with a Kafka-based
consensus utilizing 3 Orderer nodes, 4 Kafka nodes, 3
Zookeeper nodes and LevelDB Androulaki et al. (2018) as the
state database. BigchainDB blockchain is set up to run with
Tendermint consensus Kwon (2014) and MongoDB Abramova
and Bernardino (2013) as the state database. The evaluation
results are obtained for the following, with the varying
number of blockchain peers (1–15 peers) used in different
evaluations. Rahasak blockchain currently does not support




3. Transaction execution rate
4. Search performance
5. Block generate time
4.1 Transaction Throughput
For this evaluation, we recorded the number of invoke
transactions and query transactions that can be executed in
each peer in the Vind platform. Invoke transaction creates a
record in the ledger and updates the status of the assets in the
blockchain. Query searches the status of the underlying
blockchain ledger. They neither create transactions in the
ledger nor update the asset status. We flooded concurrent
transactions for each peer and recorded the number of
completed results. As shown in Figure 4, we have obtained
consistent throughput in each peer on the Vind platform.
Since queries are not updating the ledger status, it has high
throughput (2 times) compared to invoke transactions. Then the
invoke transaction throughput of Vind is tested with different
blockchain ledgers. We have implemented the Vind blockchain
ledger service with Rahasak, BigchainDB, and Hyperledger Fabric
platforms, and compared the transaction throughput results. As
shown in Figure 5, the Vind ledger with Rahasak performs with a
higher transaction throughput than BigchainDB andHyperledger
Fabric. The main reason for these observations is the enterprise-
level features available in the Rahasak blockchain. Similar to
invoke transactions, the Query operation throughput of the Vind
FIGURE 3 | Microservices-based architecture in the Vind platform. The platform is running as a permissioned blockchain system in a private cloud.
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blockchain ledger tested with different blockchain platforms.
Rahasak serves its query API via Apache Lucene index-based
search API. BigchainDB facilitates the query API with MongoDB
and Hyperledger Fabric with CouchDB. Query transaction
throughput of Rahasak is higher than that of both BigchainDB
and Hyperledger Fabric, as shown in Figure 6.
4.2 Transaction Scalability
For this evaluation, we recorded the number of executed invoke/
query transactions (per second) over the number of blockchain
peers in the network. We issued concurrent transactions in each
blockchain peer and recorded the number of executed
transactions. Figure 7 shows the transaction scalability
comparison of the Vind platforms’ blockchain. When adding a
node to the cluster, it nearly linearly increases the transaction
throughput. This means the transaction latency will be decreased
when adding blockchain peers to the cluster. Query transactions
have high scalability when comparing to invoke transactions. The
main reason is query transactions are not updating the ledger
status like invoke transactions. Then we have tested the Vind
FIGURE 4 | Invoke and query transaction throughput of single blockchain peer in the Vind platform.
FIGURE 5 | Invoke transaction result of the Vind platform with different blockchain ledgers.
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platforms’ blockchain ledger scalability results with the
different blockchain systems. As shown in Figure 8, the
transaction scalability of the Vind ledger is compared in
Rahasak, BigchainDB, and Hyperledger Fabric. Vind
blockchain ledger with Rahasak has a higher scalability than
that with BigchainDB and Hyperledger Fabric blockchains.
Both Hyperledger Fabric and BigchainDB blockchains do
not support the real-time transaction-enabled blockchain
architecture. Rahasak blockchain supports the real-time
transaction-enabled “Validate-Execute-Group” blockchain
architecture. Also, Rahasak blockchain supports the
concurrent transaction execution–enabled smart contract
platform which does not exist in BigchainDB or Hyperledger
fabric. Due to these reasons, the Vind ledger with the Rahasak
blockchain has higher scalability than BigchaindDB and
Hyperledger Fabric.
4.3 Transaction Execution Rate
Next, we evaluate the transaction execution rate in the Vind
platform. We tested the number of submitted transactions and
FIGURE 6 | Query transaction result of the Vind platform with different blockchain ledgers.
FIGURE 7 | Invoke/query transaction scalability (per second) over the number of blockchain peers in the network.
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executed transactions in different blockchain peers recording
the time. Figure 9 shows how the transaction execution rate
varies when having different numbers of blockchain peers in
the Vind. When the number of peers increases, the rate of
executed transactions is increased relatively. Figure 10 shows
the number of executed transactions and submitted
transactions in a single blockchain peer. There is a back-
pressure operation (Destounis et al., 2016; Davis, 2019)
between the rates of submitted transactions and executed
transactions. We have used a reactive streaming-based
approach with Apache Kafka to handle the back-pressure
operations in the Vind platform.
4.4 Search Performance
Vind allows searching its transaction information and asset
information via underlying Rahasak blockchains’ Lucene
index-based search API (Gormley and Tong, 2015). For this
evaluation, we issued concurrent search queries into Vind and
computed the search time. As shown in Figure 11, to search 2
million records connected, it took 4 ms of time.
FIGURE 8 | Transaction scalability (per second) of the Vind blockchain ledger with different blockchain platforms.
FIGURE 9 | Transaction execution rate comparison with a number of blockchain nodes in the Vind blockchain.
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4.5 Block Generate Time
Finally, we have evaluated the time taken to create blocks in the
underlying blockchain storage of the Vind platform. The statistics
recorded against the number of transactions in a block. Block
generate time depends on a) data replication time, b) Merkle
proof/block hash generate time, and c) transaction validation
time. When the transaction count increases in the block, these
factors will be increased. Due to this reason, when the transaction
count increases, block generation time also increases
correspondingly. As shown in Figure 12, it takes
approximately 8 s to increase a block when creating blocks of
10 k transactions.
5 RELATED WORKS
Much research has been conducted to integrate blockchain with
the supply chain management (Korpela et al., 2017). In this
section, we briefly discuss the main features and architecture
of these research projects.
FIGURE 10 | Transaction execution rate and transaction submission rate in a single blockchain peer.
FIGURE 11 | Transaction/asset search performance in the Vind blockchain platform.
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“Supply chain risk” (Mylrea and Gourisetti, 2018) and “EDS
supply chain” (Liang et al., 2018) works proposed blockchain-
based supply chain management systems for energy delivery
systems. The supply chain risk effort mainly focused on
utilizing proof of authority (PoA)-based permissioned
blockchain to manage the supply chain life cycle in the EDSs.
The supply chain of the EDS implemented the supply chain
functions in energy delivery systems using hyperledger fabric
blockchain smart contracts. These functions include identity
management, product verification, access control, contract
execution, and monitoring.
“HACCP supply chain” (Tian, 2017), “AgriBlockIoT” (Caro
et al., 2018), “Multichain WSC” (Biswas et al., 2017), and
“Agrifood Supply Chain” (Tian, 2016) works proposed
blockchain-based food supply chain management and
traceability systems. The HACCP supply chain system has
given an example scenario to demonstrate how it works in the
food supply chain with HACCP. This system is built on top of the
BigchainDB scalable blockchain system to support highly scalable
applications. The AgriBlockIOT system can rely either on the
Ethereum or the Hyperledger Sawtooth publicly available
blockchain implementations, while it is able to integrate
various IoT sensor devices. As a use case, they have
implemented and discussed traditional food supply chain
scenarios from agricultural farms to customer consumption on
top of the blockchain. Multichain WS proposed a blockchain-
based wine supply chain traceability system which is built over a
multichain-permissioned blockchain platform (Greenspan,
2015). The proposed solution is designed and implemented
with five entities in the wine supply chain, namely, grape
grower, wine producer, bulk distributor, filler/packer, and
retailer. Agrifood Supply Chain is built to help Chinese agri-
food markets to enhance their food safety and quality. They
mainly rely on the RFID technology to implement data
acquisition, circulation, and sharing in production, processing,
warehousing, distribution, and sales links of the agrifood
supply chain.
“Manufacture supply chain” (Abeyratne and Monfared, 2016)
work proposed the supply chain traceability system for
manufacturing domain. The manufacturing of cardboard
boxes is used as an example to demonstrate how such
technology can be used in a global supply chain network. The
proposed approach comprises a decentralized distributed system
that uses blockchain(s) to collect, store, and manage key
information of each product throughout its life cycle. When a
product moves its life cycle, each actor (e.g., producers, suppliers,
manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and finally the end
consumer) logs information about the product and its current
status on the blockchain network. Each product would be
attached with an information tag, which could be in the form
of a barcode, RFID, or QR code. The registered actors in the
system can access the physical asset’s virtual profile and life cycle
events by scanning the tag.
The comparison summary of these supply chain management
platforms and the Vind platform is presented in Table 1. It
compares implemented blockchain platform, blockchain type,
consensus, application domain, scalability, and privacy-level
details.
FIGURE 12 | Block creation time against the number of transactions in
the block.










Scalability Privacy NERC compliance [Cip
(2018), Mylrea and
Gourisetti (2018)]
Vind Rahasak Permissioned Paxos/ZAB Energy High High Yes
NERC CIP supply
chain
N/A Permissioned PoA Energy Mid High Yes
EDS supply chain Hyperledger Permissioned Kafka/ZAB Energy Mid High No
HACCP supply
chain
Bigchaindb Permissioned Tendermint Food High High N/A
AgriBlockIoT Ethereum Public PoS Food Mid High N/A
Multichain WSC Multichain Permissioned PoW Food(wine) Low Mid N/A
Agri-food supply
chain
Any Any Any Food N/A N/A N/A
Manufacture
supply chain
Any Any Any Manufacture N/A N/A N/A
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With Vind, we have introduced a blockchain-based cyber supply chain
provenance platform for energy delivery systems. It has addressed the
requirements of supply chain risk management. We have used
blockchain to store all the physical/software asset information, their
supply chain provenance information, and audit log information in
EDSs. To address privacy concerns, off-chain storage has been integrated
into the blockchain. By using the Rahasak blockchain to build the Vind
platform, we were able to achieve higher transaction throughput and
meet the scalability requirements. We have demonstrated the scalability
and transaction throughput requirements with extensive empirical
evaluations. Version 1.0 of the Vind platform as described above in
this article is currently running as a prototype.
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